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Joint Audit, Game Theory, and Impairment-Testing Disclosures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
We examine the consequences on impairment testing disclosures of auditor-pair choice made 
by French listed companies where two (joint) auditors are required by law. Managers are 
likely to manipulate impairment-testing disclosures since it relies on unverifiable fair value 
estimates (e.g., goodwill). From a simple game theory model, we demonstrate that a Big-4 
auditor paired with a non-Big 4 auditor increase auditors’ incentives to force firms to disclose 
more because Big 4 auditor fully bears reputation costs. Using a disclosure score for firms 
composing the French SBF 120 index from 2006 to 2009, we provide evidence that 
combination of Big 4 / non-Big 4 auditors generate higher impairment-related disclosures 
levels whereas the other combinations, i.e. two Big 4 or two non-Big 4, tend to decrease the 
level of impairment-related disclosures. These empirical results are consistent with our model 
predictions and robust to various controls variables (e.g., size, risk, year and firm fixed 
effects). 
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1. Introduction 
In France, publicly listed companies preparing consolidated financial statements are required 
to be audited by two unrelated auditors. This requirement introduces complexity in the typical 
context of the choice between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors prevailing in most developed 
countries. We aim at assessing the consequences of the different possible combinations on 
financial disclosures that are likely to be manipulated by managers, i.e. impairment-testing 
disclosures. Ramanna (2008), Ramanna and Watts (2009) and Li and Sloan (2011) 
demonstrate that goodwill impairments tend to be manipulated by managers because the 
procedure relies on unverifiable fair value estimates. Associated impairment-testing 
disclosures are also likely to be manipulated in order to support the tests’ results. Auditors 
play a central role in maintaining the objectivity and fairness of impairment tests and can take 
corrective actions to increase impairment-testing disclosures. 
Francis et al. (2009, 37) find that in France, “firms with one or two Big 4 auditors are less 
likely to have income-increasing abnormal accruals than other firms. […] firms audited by 
two Big 4 auditors are even less likely to have income-increasing accruals.” Our research 
question is to determine if an association exists between auditor-pair choice and financial 
reporting quality using impairment-testing management. We suggest testing the association 
between auditor-pair choice and impairment-testing disclosures because such disclosures are 
usually manipulated and are notoriously related to public firms’ biggest individual asset for 
which fair value estimates is required, i.e. goodwill. 
We show that from a game theory perspective, two Big 4 auditors sharing equally the 
reputation costs associated with low impairment-related disclosures, could lead to the 
prisoner’s dilemma-solution, according to which doing nothing is the dominant strategy. On 
the opposite, as Big 4 auditors paired with non-Big 4 auditors bear a large part, if not all, of 
the reputation costs associated with impairment-testing management, the dominant strategy 
for the auditor would be to take corrective actions increasing the level of financial disclosures. 
We demonstrate that the “do nothing” strategy is more likely to be dominant for a Big 4 
paired with another Big 4 auditor, leading to a socially suboptimal equilibrium where the 
level of disclosures is low. On the other hand, Big 4 auditors paired with non-Big 4 auditors 
are more likely to lead to higher levels of disclosures. We test these theoretical predictions. 
Our sample consists of all non-financial French firms composing the SBF 120 index (120 
biggest French market cap) from 2006 to 2009. Using a detailed hand-collected index 
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composed of 55 items focusing on impairment-testing disclosures from firms’ annual reports, 
we demonstrate that Big 4 auditors paired with non-Big 4 auditors generate higher levels of 
disclosures than other combinations, i.e. two Big 4 or two non-Big 4, which are significantly 
associated with lower levels of impairment related disclosures. Our results are consistent with 
the prediction of our game theory model, i.e. as Big 4 auditors bear a large part of reputation 
costs when they are paired with non-Big 4 auditors, they are more likely to force firms to 
disclose more. 
We contribute to the literature at two levels. First, we deepen the understanding of the 
consequences of the French joint audit requirement on financial statements’ quality. Hence, 
strategic interactions between joint auditors matter in terms of financial statements’ quality. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to use game theory to study joint audit. 
Second, we challenge the idea that two Big 4 auditors necessarily improve financial 
statements’ quality. Considering strategic interactions between joint auditors, we provide 
evidence that the relation between joint auditors and financial statement’s quality may be 
more complex than two Big 4 are better than one Big 4 which is better than none. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review related literature in section 2. 
Our simple game theory model and our hypotheses are exposed in section 3. We present our 
data, empirical analysis and findings in section 4. We conclude in section 5. 
2. Overview of Related Literature 
Francis et al. (2009) analyze the consequences of France’s joint audit requirement on earnings 
quality on a sample of 261 observations and find that Big 4 auditor-pairs are associated with 
lower levels of income-increasing abnormal accruals. Big 4 auditors paired with non-Big 4 
auditors are also associated with lower levels of income increasing abnormal accruals but to a 
lesser extent. Francis et al. (2009) conclude that a pecking order exists with regards to 
earnings quality and auditor-pair choices. We suggest examining this pecking order from a 
different perspective by looking at other measures of financial reporting quality, i.e. financial 
disclosures, and considering interaction between auditors. 
Impairments of assets are typically perceived as a negative asset pricing signal by market 
participants (Fields et al. 2001), which provides a primary incentive for firms to avoid 
booking or delaying impairment of assets. Multiple other incentives exist for managers to 
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avoid or delay impairment recognition including debt and compensation contracts (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986) or management reputation (Francis et al. 1996). Consequently Ramanna 
and Watts (2009) or Li and Sloan (2011) find that impairment of assets are subject to a high 
degree of manipulation by managers which benefit from a context of subjectivity permissible 
by the publication of recent standards, i.e. IAS 36 (IASB 2004) internationally and FAS 142 
(FASB 2001) in the US. External auditors play an important role in maintaining the 
objectivity and fairness of impairment tests, particularly with regards to the accuracy and 
completeness of impairment-testing disclosures. 
As the French Security Law1 requires that each joint auditor verifies the work undertaken by 
the other independent auditor leading to the joint audit report, the joint audit statement may be 
viewed as the outcome of a non-cooperative game between the two auditors. 
Game theory has already been used to describe relations between a firm and its (single) 
auditor. Strategic relations are analyzed in a cooperative game set (e.g., Demski and 
Swieringa (1974), Hatherly et al. (1996)). Demski and Swieringa (1974) advance that “the fee 
structure is (cooperatively) agreed upon” between the auditor and the auditee and that they 
both share the potential legal costs associated with unacceptable accounting methods. 
Hatherly et al. (1996) and Antle and Nalebuff (1991) also consider that auditor and auditee 
jointly agree on a strategy and the auditing process. On the other hand, other papers suppose 
non-cooperative interactions between auditor and auditee (e.g., Fellingham and Newman 
(1985), Matsumura and Tucker (1992), (Cook et al. 1997)). In this setting the auditor can take 
actions to control the auditee and the conditions for the socially desirable outcome to occur 
are studied. To our knowledge, game theory has never been used to model strategic 
interactions between joint auditors. 
In the next section we describe our simple game model and our hypotheses. 
  
                                                 
1
 French Financial Security Law (2003). « Loi No 2003-706 du 1 août 2003 de sécurité financière, version 
consolidée au 1er  avril 2006 », available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. Francis et al. (2009, 38) provide 
details on the specificity of the audit market in France.  
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3. Simple Joint Audit Game and Development of Hypotheses 
As firms may be reluctant to voluntary disclose, the socially desirable outcome of audit is to 
force firms to produce sufficient levels of disclosures. The competitive nature of the audit 
industry can be structured as a non-cooperative game between auditors. When investigating 
the level of information produced by firms, auditors decide whether or not taking corrective 
actions, hence conditioning the level of firms’ disclosures. 
3.1. Two Player Game with Homogeneous Auditor Pair 
We hypothesize that joint auditors have the choice between two strategies: taking “corrective 
actions” to increase the level of disclosure or taking “no action.” We further hypothesize that: 
- Taking corrective actions to increase the level of disclosure generates costs CCA for 
auditors. These costs are shared equally between the two auditors (1/2*CCA) when they 
both decide to take corrective actions (the cost of “no action” are set to zero). Auditors 
bear the full amount of costs CCA when they decide to take corrective actions alone. 
- If no auditor takes corrective action the level of voluntary disclosure will be “low,” 
but one auditor choosing to take “corrective actions” is sufficient to generate the 
socially optimal “high” level of disclosure (solutions marked with a star in Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
- Finally, if auditors are associated with a low-disclosing firm, they bear reputation 
costs CREP. Those costs are shared equally (1/2*CREP) between the joint-auditors. 
With a homogenous auditor pair the players, strategies and payoff can be represented in a 
reduced strategic form as in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
The Nash equilibrium solution for this two person game will depend on the relative value of 
the “corrective actions” strategy’s costs as compared to the reputation costs generated by the 
“no-action” strategy. 
Lemma 1:  
If 1/2*CREP < CCA then the Nash equilibrium solution is given when both firm do not take 
corrective actions similar to the prisoners’ dilemma solution. 
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Proof: Auditor #1 “no action” strategy dominates when auditor #2 chooses to take “corrective 
actions” since -1/2*CCA < 0 and also dominates when auditor #2 chooses to make “no-action” 
since 1/2*CREP < CCA by hypothesis. The same argument holds true for the other player. 
The meaning of this result is that if reputation costs are low enough, either because they are 
low in absolute terms or because they are shared by the two auditors, then the auditors will 
choose to take “no-action” and the level of disclosure will be socially too low.2 This is the 
typical case in the prisoners’ dilemma game. Therefore we make the following hypothesis:  
H1: Firms with a homogeneous auditor pair are more likely to produce a lower level of 
impairment-testing disclosures than other firms. 
In the next paragraph, we introduce heterogeneity among auditors. 
3.2. Introducing Big 4 / Non-Big 4 Auditor Types 
We now introduce two types of players: Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. We assume the 
following differences between the two types of auditors: 
- Because of economies of scale and human capital, the costs of taking corrective 
actions to achieve the same level of disclosures for non-Big 4 are greater than for Big 
4 such that  =  ∗  (with k > 1).3 We hypothesize a linear relationship 
between the costs for non-Big 4 and Big 4 auditors.4 If both auditors decides to take 
corrective actions, the costs is reduced for Big 4 auditor to 1/2*CCA, and to k/2*CCA 
for non-Big 4 auditor. 
- The reputation costs CREP generated when an auditor is associated with low disclosing-
firm are higher for a Big 4 than for non-Big 4 because they have “more to lose” 
(DeAngelo 1981, 183). In our model, we hypothesize that all the reputation costs fall 
on the Big 4 auditor and none fall on the non-Big 4 auditor. 
With a heterogeneous auditor pair the players, strategies and payoff can be represented in a 
reduced strategic form as in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
                                                 
2
 One could also argue that two Big 4 auditors reduce the absolute level of reputation costs since they both signal 
the quality of financial statements. 
3
 We believe that impairment-testing disclosures offer a great setting since they rely on fair value that require a 
high level of human capital that non-Big 4 auditors are less likely to own. 
4
 A fixed cost X could also be added to CCA such that 
4 = 
 + . 
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As in the previous case, the Nash equilibrium solution for this two person game with two 
types of auditors will depend on the relative value of the “corrective actions” strategy’s costs 
as compared to the reputation costs generated by low disclosure. 
Lemma 2: 
If CREP > CCA then the Nash equilibrium solution is given when Big-4 auditor takes 
“corrective actions” and non-Big 4 auditor chooses to free ride by taking “no-action.” 
Proof: 
The non-Big 4 auditor strategy of taking “no action” strictly dominates the other strategy 
since -k*CCA < -k/2*CCA < 0. Given the non-Big 4 strategy, the Big 4 strategy of taking 
“correcting actions” dominates the “no-action” strategy if and only if CREP > CCA. 
The understanding of this result is that as non-Big 4 auditors bear to a much lesser extent 
reputation costs (here none) and face higher costs to implement the corrective actions 
strategy, they have no incentive to take actions, i.e. the strategy “no action” strictly dominates 
the other strategy. As a result the non-Big 4 auditor acts as a free rider. Given the choice of 
the non-Big 4 auditor, the Big 4 auditor will choose to take corrective actions only if the 
reputation costs associated with low disclosure (that they fully bear) exceed the costs of 
taking corrective actions alone. As a result, we make the following assumption: 
H2: Firms with a heterogeneous auditor pair are more likely to produce higher level of 
impairment-testing disclosures than other firms. 
In the next section we provide empirical tests of H1 and H2. 
4. Empirical Application 
4.1. Measuring the Level of Impairment-Testing Disclosures 
Standard IAS 36 “Impairment of assets” (IASB 2004) prescribes the procedures and 
disclosures required to perform impairment tests. Standard IAS 36 covers a large range of 
assets from tangible to intangible assets, including goodwill. Impairments are required to be 
reported in profit or loss if the net book value of an asset is higher than the recoverable value 
being the highest of fair value or value in use. If impossible to determine the recoverable 
amount for an individual asset, the standard prescribes to determine recoverable amount for 
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groups of assets known as cash generating units. In order to include individual assets in a 
specific cash generating unit, the associated cash flows must be independent from cash flows 
stemming from other cash generating units. Goodwill is typically allocated to one or several 
cash generating units and tested indirectly within the cash generating unit. The fair value 
estimate of the cash generating unit is typically based either on a discounted cash flow 
approach or on a relative valuation method. 
Impairments of assets are based on management estimates. Managers usually acknowledge 
that they use specific assumptions for impairment testing purposes. For example in Alcatel-
Lucent’s 2008 annual report (p. 245) the management states: “The recoverable values of our 
goodwill and intangible assets, as determined for the impairment tests performed by the 
Group, are based on key assumptions which could have a significant impact on the 
consolidated financial statements. These key assumptions include, among other things, the 
following elements: discount rate; and projected cash-flows […].” 
For French listed firms, disclosures with regards to these impairment testing procedures vary 
greatly from a firm to another. For instance the French pharmaceutical company Stallergenes 
in its 2006 annual report’s “main accounting methods” section (p. 41), provides only minimal 
narrative information with regard to impairment tests such as “A writedown is recorded once 
a year or more frequently if events or changes in circumstances indicate the likelihood of 
impairment for that acquisition goodwill” and “If an impairment is identified, the recoverable 
of the CGU to which the acquisition goodwill belongs is assessed. An impairment is 
recognized as soon as the book value of the CGU to which the acquisition goodwill belongs 
exceeds the recoverable value.” No further information concerning impairment tests is 
provided in the notes, although the firm owns a substantial amount of intangibles assets for 
which impairment tests are required to be performed at least once a year. 
On the opposite, France Telecom’s 2008 annual report contains a much greater amount of 
information regarding impairment-testing procedures. In its note 6 (p. 287-289), the company 
dedicates almost three pages to its impairment tests and provide a wide range of information. 
The management explains the level at which goodwill is tested, and provides in tables the key 
assumptions used in the estimation of recoverable amounts (e.g., growth rate to perpetuity, 
main cash generating units and groups of cash generating units, post and pre-tax discount 
rates used), as well as narrative explanations for specific countries. 
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Considering this various disclosure levels and the incentives to manipulate impairment-testing 
disclosures, we examine every annual report produced by French non-financial 120 top-listed 
firms (SBF 120 index) from 2006 to 2009. We look for 55 items covering the main aspects of 
impairment-testing disclosures. Table 4 exhibits the main categories, sub-categories and 
number of items in each sub-category covered by our disclosure score. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
By attributing one point by item that shows up in firm i’s annual report for year t, the 
resulting score is computed as: 
, =
1
55, ∗ 100

 !"
 
 
(1) 
We divide the sum of the items by the maximum number of points and multiply it by 100 in 
order to obtain the dependent variable Score ranging from 0 to 100. 
As presented in Table 4, our disclosure score is quite comprehensive as it covers technical 
valuation aspects of impairment tests (e.g., discount rates, neutrality of the financing 
structure, terminal value issues) as well as qualitative aspects (e.g., presentation of the 
alternative fair value or value in use, use of independent experts).  
In the next paragraph we explain our methodology to test the association between 
impairment-testing disclosures and auditor pair choice. 
4.2. Auditor-Pair Choice and Association with Impairment-Testing Disclosures 
To determine if the joint audit pair has an impact on the level of disclosures, we estimate 
model (2) using firm and year fixed effects, where Auditor_Pair is the main variable of 
interest: 
, =  + # + $" ∗ 
%&'_)*', + $+ ∗ ,, + $- ∗ .'/, + $ ∗ '0, + 
$ ∗ 12*, + 3* + 4 
(2) 
Where for firm i and year t: 
• Scorei,t is our self-constructed score for firms’ impairment related disclosures; 
• Auditor_Pairi,t  is one of the three following dummy variables: 
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- Big4_Big4i,t equaling 1 if both firm’s external auditors are among the four 
largest audit companies; 
-  Big4_Smalli,t  equaling 1 if one of the two external auditors is among the four 
largest audit companies and the other is not; 
-  Small_Smalli,t  equaling 1 if both firm’s external auditors are not among the 
four largest audit companies; 
• Impi,t  is a dummy variable equaling 1 when the firm has an impairment of intangible 
asset; 
• Riski,t is the firm’s 5-year beta; 
• Sizei,t is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity; 
• Floati,t is the percentage of firm’s publicly exchanged equity (free float). 
We expect the following relationships between the dependent and independent variables: 
• a negative relationship between Scorei,t and Auditor_Pairi,t  when it is defined as 
Big4_Big4i,t  or Small_Smalli,t., because homogenous auditor-pair could be associated 
to lower levels of impairment-testing disclosures consistent with the prisoners’ 
dilemma solution (hypothesis H1); 
• a positive relationship when Auditor_Pairi,t is defined as Big4_Smalli,t as a 
heterogeneous auditor-pair could lead to a higher level of impairment-testing 
disclosures (consistent with our model predicting H1); 
• a positive relationship with Impi,t as the occurrence of an impairment could trigger 
additional disclosures explaining the impact and potential reasons for this bad news; 
• a positive relationship is expected with Riski,t as risky firms need to reduce the 
external perception of their riskiness by producing additional disclosures; 
• a positive relationship with Sizei,t is expected as firm’s size allows to dedicate more 
resources to the production of financial disclosures; 
• a positive relationship is expected with Floati,t as outside investors are the primary 
users of annual reports. This increase the likelihood of finding additional disclosures 
in the annual report when free float represent a large portion of the equity. 
We present the sample in the next section.  
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4.3. Data and Sample 
We start our sample with the 120 firms composting the SBF 120 index over the period 2006 
to 2009. We remove the 10 financial firms composing the index due to the specificities of the 
industry’s disclosures. Due to missing variables for some firms, our final sample is composed 
of 94 firms and 355 firm-year observations. 
The dispersion and evolution of the disclosure score is exhibited in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
The dispersion of the firms’ scores in the sample is relatively high and firms improve their 
impairment-testing disclosures over the period 2006-2009. 
Table 5 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample.  
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
From Table 5, Panel A, it appears that 41% of the firms are audited by a Big 4 auditor-pair 
over the period, 56% of firms are audited by a Big 4 paired with a non-Big 4 auditor and the 
remaining 3% are audited by a pair of non-Big 4 auditors. Changes of either one or two 
auditors during a year does not occur frequently, i.e. only 6% of the time.  
The mean (median) impairment-testing disclosure score for the four-year period is 53 points 
(54 points) and range from a minimum of 13 points and a maximum of 89 points over the 
period. The dispersion of the score measured by standard deviation is almost 17 points. The 
mean (median) risk of firms in the sample as proxied by 5-year beta is 0.84 (0.84), the mean 
(median) size is 7.33 (7.24). The mean (median) percentage of firms’ shareholder’s equity 
that is publicly traded (free float) is 65% (67%). Finally impairment of assets occurs on 
average 41% of the time during the period 2006 to 2009. 
From Table 5, Panel B, we can see that Score is positively correlated with Big4_Big4 and 
negatively correlated with Big4_Small, going against our hypotheses H1 and H2. However, 
these correlations are not statistically different from zero (at 10%) and can be difficult to take 
into account without controlling for other factors (e.g., size or risk). As bigger firms disclose 
more, and are usually audited by two Big 4 auditors, the correlation could simply indicate the 
effect of size.  
We present the results of our multivariate analysis, which introduce several control variables, 
in the next paragraph.  
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4.4. Empirical Findings 
The association between auditor-pair choice and impairment-related disclosures is tested with 
model (2). Table 6 exhibits the results of the panel estimation with year and firm fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
From Table 6, the main results are that pairs of Big 4 auditors significantly decrease the level 
of impairment related disclosures with a magnitude of approximately 7 points, whereas Big 4 
auditors paired with non-Big 4 auditors increases the level of disclosures provided of 
approximately 6 points. The results are significant at the 5% level using standard two-tails t-
tests. Pairs of non-Big 4 auditors (Small_Small) are associated with lower level of disclosures 
(negative sign on the coefficient) but the relation is not significant. However this case 
represents only 3% of the sample’s observations. These results are consistent with our game 
theory model predictions, i.e. Big 4 auditors pair sharing the reputation costs are less likely to 
engage in forcing firms to disclosure more than a Big 4 auditor paired with a non-Big 4 
auditor. 
From the control variables presented in Table 6, it appears that Risk and Float significantly 
increase the level of impairment-testing disclosures. The score is increasing through time as 
the coefficient on the year dummies rises for years 2008 and 2009 confirming what was 
observed on Figure 1. Size and Imp variables do not appear to be significantly related with 
impairment-testing disclosures which are mandatory even in the absence of an impairment of 
asset. 
5. Conclusion 
Recent literature (e.g., Li and Sloan (2011), Ramanna (2008) and(Ramanna and Watts 2009)) 
demonstrate that recent standard publications allowing the use of unverifiable fair value 
estimates, i.e. FAS 142 (FASB 2001) and IAS 36 (IASB 2004), led to manipulation and 
delaying of impairment of assets. Impairment-testing disclosures are also likely to be distorted 
in order to enable managers to manipulate the outcome of their tests. In that context external 
auditors play a key role in ensuring that impairment tests are objectively conducted. French 
requirement of a joint audit is a unique opportunity to study if the decision making process is 
improved by the presence of two auditors. 
Francis et al. (2009)’s results support the idea that Big 4 auditor paired with other Big 4 
auditors are associated with higher earnings quality than only one Big 4 auditor paired with a 
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non-Big 4 auditor, or than two non-Big 4 auditors. We test this pecking order in the context of 
impairment-testing disclosures using a simple game theory model. We demonstrate that 
homogeneity among auditor-pairs can lead to the prisoners’ dilemma solution and a socially 
sub-optimal disclosure level. This situation is less likely to occur with a Big 4 paired with a 
non-Big 4 auditor as the Big 4 auditor fully bears the reputation costs. On a sample of French 
top-listed firms, we found that heterogeneous auditor-pairs lead to significantly increasing 
impairment-testing disclosures whereas Big 4 auditor-pairs generate significantly lower levels 
of impairment-testing disclosures. These results are consistent with our theoretical 
predictions. 
One could argue that these results may be specific to impairment-testing disclosures. The 
relationship between auditor-pair choice and financial reporting quality could be tested with 
other type of disclosures or other proxy for financial reporting quality. France’s unique setting 
offers a great field to test for costs and benefits associated with the joint audit requirement. 
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Figure 1 – Repartition of the Impairment-Testing Disclosure Score from 2006 to 2009 
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Table 1 – Auditors Strategies and Firm Disclosures 
 
 Auditor #1 
 
 Corrective actions No-action 
 
Auditor #2 Corrective actions High disclosures* High disclosures* 
No-action High disclosures* Low disclosures 
Table 1 describes the level of disclosures conditionally to auditors’ strategies. The socially 
optimal outcomes are indicated with a star. 
Table 2 – Joint-Audit Game with Two Auditors of the Same type 
  Auditor #1 
 
 Corrective actions No-action 
 
Auditor #2  Corrective actions (-1/2*CCA ; -1/2*CCA) (0 ; - CCA) 
No-action (-CCA; 0) (-1/2*CREP ; -1/2*CREP)  
Table 2 describes the game’s payoff conditional to the players strategies. CCA represents the 
costs of adopting the “corrective actions” strategy, CREP are the reputation costs in case of low 
disclosure. 
Table 3 – Joint-Audit Game with a Big-4 and a non-Big-4 Auditor 
  Big 4 auditor 
 
 Corrective actions No-action 
 
non-Big 4 
auditor 
Corrective actions (-1/2*CCA; -k/2*CCA) (0 ; -k*CCA) 
No-action (-CCA ; 0) (-CREP ; 0)  
Table 3 describes the game’s payoff conditional to the players strategies. CCA represents the 
costs of adopting the “corrective actions” strategy, CREP are the reputation costs in case of low 
disclosure. 
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Table 4 – Summary of the Major Items composing the Impairment Testing Disclosure Index 
Main categories Sub-categories # Items 
I. Presentation and reference to 
Standard IAS 36 “Impairment of 
assets” 
 
1. Explicit presentation of the alternative Fair Value 
and/or Utility Value 
2. Standard IAS 36 explicitly mentioned 
 
3 
II. Valuation method: fair value or 
value-in-use 
3. Methodology explained: DCF (Value in use), Fair 
Value or other method 
4 
III. Methods used 
 
4. One approach by cash-generating units or several 
approaches 
3 
IV. Number of cash-generating units 5. Number of business units > 1 mentioned 1 
V. Computation of the cost of 
capital 
 
6. Explicit reference to a model 
7. Tax issues mentioned 
8. Details provided on the computation of the cost of 
capital 
9. Formula of computing mentioned 
 
 
5 
VI. Number of discount rates 
 
10. Several discount rates used (by cash generating 
units) 
11. Details on adjustment methods 
8 
VII. Financing neutrality and 
discount rate 
12. Neutrality of the financing structure on the discount 
rate mentioned 
 
1 
VIII. Origin of the discount rate 
 
13.Use of independent experts for tests 
14. Use of independent experts and/of financial analysts 
3 
IX. Cost of capital components 
 
15. Discount rate mentioned 
16. Risk-free rate mentioned 
17. “Beta” mentioned 
18. “Beta” of the company or of peer-group firms 
mentioned 
19. Equity risk premium mentioned 
20. Target financial structure mentioned 
 
 
 
8 
X. Impairment test sensitivity 
 
21. Sensitivity tests performed 
22. Sensitivity on the cash flows mentioned 
2 
XI. Explanation of the variations of 
the discount rate 
23. Explanations of rates’ variations per components 4 
XII. Cash flows 24. Value in use per se or market data 4 
XIII. Discount rate & cash flows 
adequacy 
25. Adequacy between cash flows and rate mentioned 1 
XIV. Explicit cash flow projecting 
period 
 
26. Explicit period between forecasts and terminal value 
27. Explicit forecasting period explained 
28. Extrapolation period explained 
 
5 
XV. Terminal value 
 
29. Methods of terminal value computing mentioned 
30. If several methods mentioned, multiple or infinite 
growth rate used 
 
3 
  
Total : 
55 
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Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Panel A – Univariate Statistics 
Unit N Mean St.Dev Min 1st Q Med 3rd Q Max 
Big4_Big4 (%) 355 41.49 
Big4_Small (%) 355 55.87 
Small_Small (%) 355 2.64 
Change (%) 355 6.42 
Score Pts 355 52.8 16.6 13.3 42.5 54.2 64.2 89.2 
Risk Beta 355 0.84 0.32 0.18 0.61 0.84 1.05 1.60 
Size Ln(mv) 355 7.33 1.62 1.10 6.21 7.24 8.37 11.78 
Float (%) 355 65.46 25.38 12.70 45.50 66.50 90.00 100.00 
Imp (%) 355 40.79 
Big4_Big4 is a dummy variable equaling 1 if both firm’s external auditors are among the four largest 
audit companies. Big4_Small is a dummy variable equaling 1 if one of the two external auditors is 
among the four largest audit companies and the other is not. Small_Small is a dummy variable 
equaling 1 if both firm’s external auditor are not among the four largest audit companies. Change is a 
dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm changes external auditor during the fiscal year. Score is our 
self-constructed index for firms’ impairment related disclosure. Risk is the firm’s 5-year beta. Size is 
the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Float is the percentage of the publicly exchanged part 
of the firm’s equity. Imp is a dummy variable equaling 1 when the firm has an impairment of 
intangible asset. 
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Panel B – Correlation Matrix between Variables (P-Value are indicated in parenthesis) 
Big4_Big4 Big4_Small Small_Small Change Score Risk Size Float Imp 
Big4_Big4 1.000 
Big4_Small -0.944 1.000 
(0.000) 
Small_Small -0.143 -0.191 1.000 
(0.005) (0.000) 
Change 0.001 -0.070 0.211 1.000 
(0.985) (0.229) (0.000) 
Score 0.065 -0.076 -0.032 -0.012 1.000 
(0.188) (0.133) (0.532) (0.840) 
Risk 0.198 -0.219 0.005 -0.048 0.281 1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.925) (0.415) (0.000) 
Size 0.316 -0.271 -0.171 0.003 0.134 0.213 1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.965) (0.010) (0.000) 
Float 0.022 0.006 -0.010 0.045 0.150 0.340 0.042 1.000 
(0.668) (0.901) (0.847) (0.445) (0.003) (0.000) (0.422) 
Imp 0.079 -0.148 0.105 0.042 0.148 0.199 0.084 0.075 1.000 
(0.113) (0.003) (0.037) (0.468) (0.003) (0.000) (0.104) (0.135) 
Big4_Big4 is a dummy variable equaling 1 if both firm’s external auditors are among the four largest audit companies. Big4_Small is a dummy variable 
equaling 1 if one of the two external auditors is among the four largest audit companies and the other is not. Small_Small is a dummy variable equaling 1 if 
both firm’s external auditor are not among the four largest audit companies. Change is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm changes external auditor 
during the fiscal year. Score is our self-constructed index for firms’ impairment related disclosure. Risk is the firm’s 5-year beta. Size is the natural logarithm 
of market value of equity. Float is the percentage of the publicly exchanged part of the firm’s equity. Imp is a dummy variable equaling 1 when the firm has 
an impairment of intangible asset. 
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Table 6 – Joint Audit Pair and Impairment-Testing Disclosures 
Coeff. t-stat P.Value Coeff. t-stat P.Value Coeff. t-stat P.Value 
Big4_Big4 -7.184** -2.099 0.037 
Big4_Small 6.437** 2.398 0.017 
Small_Small -6.181 -1.386 0.167 
Imp 0.366 0.310 0.757 0.715 0.609 0.543 0.922 0.779 0.437 
Risk 8.685*** 3.612 0.000 6.855*** 2.784 0.006 6.175** 2.489 0.013 
Size 1.241 0.933 0.352 1.131 0.856 0.393 1.186 0.886 0.377 
Float 8.961** 2.071 0.039 10.806** 2.498 0.013 11.154** 2.556 0.011 
Y2007 2.479** 2.251 0.025 2.383** 2.174 0.031 2.233** 2.025 0.044 
Y2008 7.056*** 6.263 0.000 7.134*** 6.359 0.000 6.931*** 6.157 0.000 
Y2009 10.857*** 9.491 0.000 10.794*** 9.444 0.000 10.385*** 9.167 0.000 
_cons 27.786*** 2.715 0.007 22.537*** 2.245 0.026 26.375*** 2.584 0.010 
R² 0.371 0.369 0.359 
Adj. R² 0.121 0.117 0.104 
F 19.126 18.476 17.734 
P(F) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 355 355 355 
Firm-fixed 
effects (yes) (yes) (yes) 
*p<.1 (two-sided tests); **p<.05(two-sided tests); ***p<.01 (two-sided tests) 
